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Abstract	  
We	  investigated	  whether	  young	  children	  are	  able	  to	  infer	  affiliative	  relations	  and	  
relative	  status	  from	  observing	  others’	  imitative	  interactions.	  Children	  watched	  
videos	  showing	  one	  individual	  imitating	  another	  and	  were	  asked	  about	  the	  
relationship	  between	  those	  individuals.	  Experiment	  1	  showed	  that	  5-­‐year-­‐olds	  
assume	  individuals	  imitate	  people	  they	  like.	  	  Experiment	  2	  showed	  that	  children	  
of	  the	  same	  age	  assume	  that	  an	  individual	  who	  imitates	  is	  relatively	  low	  in	  status.	  	  
Thus,	  although	  there	  are	  many	  advantages	  to	  imitating	  others,	  there	  may	  also	  be	  
reputational	  costs.	  Younger	  children,	  4-­‐year-­‐olds,	  did	  not	  reliably	  make	  either	  
inference.	  	  Taken	  together,	  these	  experiments	  demonstrate	  that	  imitation	  
conveys	  valuable	  information	  about	  third-­‐party	  relationships	  and	  that,	  at	  least	  
by	  the	  age	  of	  five,	  children	  are	  able	  to	  use	  this	  information	  in	  order	  to	  infer	  who	  
is	  allied	  with	  whom	  and	  who	  is	  dominant	  over	  whom.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  add	  a	  
new	  dimension	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  imitation	  in	  human	  social	  life.	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Children	  infer	  affiliative	  and	  status	  relations	  from	  watching	  others	  imitate	  
Imitation,	  or	  reproducing	  the	  observed	  actions	  of	  others,	  plays	  a	  critical	  
role	  in	  learning	  about	  the	  physical	  world	  (Flynn	  &	  Whiten,	  2010;	  Gergely	  &	  
Csibra,	  2005;	  Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005;	  Tomasello,	  1999).	  Through	  imitation,	  we	  
learn,	  among	  other	  things,	  how	  to	  find	  and	  prepare	  food,	  how	  to	  make	  and	  use	  
tools,	  and	  how	  to	  build	  shelter	  against	  the	  elements	  (Boyd,	  Richerson,	  &	  Henrich,	  
2011;	  Flynn	  &	  Whiten,	  2008).	  	  In	  addition	  to	  helping	  us	  learn	  about	  the	  physical	  
world,	  imitation	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  learning	  about	  the	  social	  world.	  By	  
copying	  those	  around	  us,	  we	  learn	  the	  conventions	  of	  our	  group,	  how	  to	  
communicate	  with	  others,	  and	  how	  to	  interact	  with	  them	  (Heyes,	  2013;	  
Kenward;	  2012;	  Rakoczy,	  Warneken,	  &	  Tomasello,	  2008).	  In	  short,	  we	  learn	  how	  
to	  be	  good	  group	  members	  (Over	  &	  Carpenter,	  2012;	  2013).	  	  
	   Beyond	  its	  role	  in	  learning	  about	  the	  physical	  and	  social	  world,	  imitation	  
plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  regulating	  our	  social	  relationships.	  Experimental	  research	  
with	  adults	  has	  shown	  that	  we	  use	  imitation	  as	  a	  way	  to	  affiliate	  with	  others.	  
Lakin	  and	  Chartrand	  (2003),	  for	  example,	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  we	  copy	  the	  
actions	  of	  a	  social	  partner	  more	  closely	  when	  we	  have	  been	  primed	  with	  
affiliation	  (see	  also	  Lakin,	  Chartrand,	  &	  Arkin,	  2008).	  	  Being	  imitated	  also	  has	  
positive	  social-­‐affiliative	  consequences:	  Chartrand	  and	  Bargh	  (1999)	  have	  shown	  
that	  when	  a	  social	  partner	  mimics	  our	  actions,	  we	  like	  them	  more.	  The	  role	  of	  
imitation	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  affiliative	  relationships,	  however.	  	  Other	  research	  has	  
shown	  that	  we	  use	  imitation	  as	  a	  means	  by	  which	  to	  regulate	  hierarchical	  social	  
relationships.	  For	  example,	  adults	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  imitate	  high	  status	  
individuals	  (the	  so-­‐called	  ‘prestige	  bias’;	  Henrich	  &	  Gil-­‐White,	  2001).	  	  	  
	   Research	  on	  these	  social	  regulatory	  functions	  of	  imitation	  has	  focused	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almost	  exclusively	  on	  participants’	  own	  imitation	  or	  reactions	  to	  being	  imitated.	  
However,	  imitation	  often	  takes	  place	  within	  a	  broader	  social	  context	  (Kavanagh,	  
Suhler,	  Churchland,	  &	  Winkielman,	  2011;	  Nielsen,	  2009;	  Over	  &	  Carpenter,	  2012;	  
2013)	  and	  imitative	  interactions	  are	  regularly	  observed	  by	  others.	  This	  means	  
that,	  in	  principle,	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  use	  our	  observations	  of	  others’	  imitation	  to	  
extract	  information	  about	  their	  relationships,	  for	  example,	  to	  infer	  who	  is	  allied	  
with	  whom	  and	  who	  is	  dominant	  over	  whom.	  	  
	   If	  imitation	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  our	  ability	  to	  infer	  the	  nature	  of	  third	  party	  
relationships,	  then	  it	  may	  also	  have	  reputational	  consequences.	  It	  is	  often	  
pointed	  out	  that,	  both	  when	  imitation	  is	  used	  to	  learn	  and	  when	  it	  is	  used	  to	  
affiliate,	  it	  brings	  advantages	  to	  the	  imitator.	  When	  we	  learn	  a	  new	  skill	  through	  
imitation,	  we	  avoid	  the	  time-­‐consuming,	  error-­‐prone,	  and	  sometimes	  dangerous	  
process	  of	  acquiring	  the	  skill	  through	  trial	  and	  error,	  and	  we	  can	  acquire	  
capabilities	  that,	  due	  to	  their	  complexity,	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  learn	  on	  our	  
own	  (Gergely	  &	  Csibra,	  2006;	  Tennie,	  Call,	  &	  Tomasello,	  2009;	  Tomasello,	  1999).	  
Furthermore,	  when	  we	  imitate	  during	  a	  social	  interaction,	  we	  increase	  the	  
probability	  that	  our	  social	  partners	  will	  bond	  with	  us,	  and	  even	  increase	  the	  
probability	  that	  they	  will	  help	  us	  in	  the	  future	  (van	  Baaren,	  Holland,	  Kawakami,	  
&	  van	  Knippenberg,	  2004).	  	  However,	  imitation	  may	  also	  have	  some	  reputational	  
costs.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  imitate	  people	  who	  are	  higher	  status	  
than	  ourselves,	  imitation	  might	  signal	  to	  onlookers	  that	  someone	  who	  imitates	  is	  
lower	  in	  status	  than	  the	  person	  he	  or	  she	  imitates.	  	  As	  high	  status	  is	  generally	  
seen	  as	  desirable,	  and	  is	  often	  sought	  after	  within	  social	  interactions	  (Cheng,	  
Tracy,	  Foulsham,	  Kingstone,	  &	  Henrich,	  2013;	  Henrich	  &	  Gil-­‐White,	  2001;	  
Martens,	  Tracy,	  &	  Shariff,	  2012),	  being	  observed	  imitating	  another	  may	  have	  
	   5	  
some	  disadvantages.	  	  
Previous	  research	  with	  adults	  has	  shown	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  determine	  
the	  nature	  of	  third	  party	  relationships	  from	  the	  interactants’	  nonverbal	  behavior	  
and	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  imitation	  within	  the	  interaction	  may	  inform	  these	  
judgments	  (Grahe	  &	  Bernieri,	  1999).	  	  Other	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  an	  
individual’s	  imitative	  behavior	  can	  influence	  how	  he	  or	  she	  is	  perceived	  by	  adult	  
onlookers.	  Bavelas,	  Black,	  Lemery,	  and	  Mullett	  (1986),	  for	  example,	  showed	  that	  
individuals	  who	  copy	  a	  victim’s	  pained	  expression	  are	  thought	  by	  raters	  to	  care	  
more	  about	  the	  victim’s	  suffering.	  	  In	  other	  research,	  Kavanagh	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  
presented	  participants	  with	  videos	  in	  which	  an	  individual	  copied	  the	  
mannerisms	  of	  either	  a	  cordial	  or	  a	  condescending	  interviewer.	  Participants	  
rated	  this	  individual	  as	  competent	  when	  he	  copied	  the	  mannerisms	  of	  the	  cordial	  
interviewer	  but	  incompetent	  when	  he	  copied	  the	  mannerisms	  of	  the	  
condescending	  interviewer.	  	  	  
	   Here,	  we	  explore	  what	  imitation	  might	  convey	  to	  onlookers	  about	  two	  
types	  of	  social	  relationships:	  affiliation	  and	  relative	  status.	  In	  order	  to	  investigate	  
just	  how	  deep-­‐rooted	  the	  ability	  to	  use	  imitation	  to	  make	  these	  types	  of	  
judgments	  is,	  we	  chose	  to	  investigate	  these	  questions	  in	  young	  children.	  Below	  
we	  review	  the	  developmental	  evidence	  that	  led	  us	  to	  hypothesize	  that	  even	  
children	  might	  show	  these	  abilities.	  	  
	   First,	  we	  hypothesized	  that	  children	  may	  be	  able	  to	  use	  observations	  of	  
others’	  imitation	  to	  infer	  whether	  individuals	  have	  a	  positive,	  affiliative	  
relationship.	  We	  did	  so	  because	  previous	  research	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  
imitation	  is	  linked	  with	  affiliation	  in	  children’s	  own	  interactions,	  just	  as	  it	  is	  in	  
adults’	  (Nielsen,	  2006;	  2009;	  Over	  &	  Carpenter,	  2012;	  2013).	  Over	  and	  Carpenter	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(2009b),	  for	  example,	  demonstrated	  that	  5-­‐year-­‐old	  children	  copy	  the	  actions	  of	  
a	  model	  more	  closely	  when	  affiliation	  is	  important	  to	  them;	  that	  is,	  when	  they	  
have	  been	  primed	  with	  the	  threat	  of	  exclusion	  from	  the	  group	  as	  opposed	  to	  
when	  they	  have	  been	  given	  a	  more	  neutral	  prime	  (see	  Watson-­‐Jones,	  Legare,	  
Whitehouse,	  &	  Clegg,	  in	  press,	  for	  a	  replication	  and	  extension	  of	  this	  result).	  
Furthermore,	  Nielsen	  and	  Blank	  (2011)	  demonstrated	  that	  4-­‐	  to	  5-­‐year-­‐old	  
children	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  copy	  the	  specific	  actions	  of	  a	  model	  when	  she	  is	  
present	  to	  watch	  their	  imitation	  than	  when	  she	  leaves	  the	  room	  (see	  also	  Haun	  &	  
Tomasello,	  2011;	  Király,	  2009).	  Children	  also	  respond	  positively	  to	  being	  
imitated	  from	  very	  early	  in	  development	  (e.g.,	  Meltzoff,	  1990).	  For	  example,	  18-­‐
month-­‐olds	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  help	  an	  experimenter	  who	  has	  previously	  copied	  
their	  actions	  than	  they	  are	  to	  help	  one	  who	  has	  engaged	  in	  equally	  contingent	  
but	  non-­‐imitative	  behavior	  (Carpenter,	  Uebel,	  &	  Tomasello,	  2013)	  and	  older	  
children	  (5-­‐	  to	  6-­‐year-­‐olds)	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  trust	  an	  experimenter	  who	  has	  
copied	  them	  (Over,	  Carpenter,	  Spears,	  &	  Gattis,	  2013).	  This	  close	  connection	  
between	  imitation	  and	  affiliation	  in	  children’s	  own	  behavior	  makes	  it	  plausible	  
that	  children	  will	  be	  able	  to	  recognize	  a	  link	  between	  imitation	  and	  affiliation	  in	  
their	  observations	  of	  third	  party	  interactions.	  
	   Beyond	  affiliation,	  children	  might	  also	  be	  able	  to	  use	  observations	  of	  
others’	  imitative	  behavior	  as	  a	  means	  by	  which	  to	  infer	  relative	  status.	  	  Recent	  
research	  has	  shown	  that	  even	  preschool	  children	  are	  sensitive	  to	  differences	  in	  
status	  (e.g.,	  Brey	  &	  Shutts,	  in	  press;	  Horwitz,	  Shutts,	  &	  Olson,	  in	  press).	  	  
Furthermore,	  there	  are	  hints	  from	  previous	  research	  that	  status	  differences	  are	  
associated	  with	  differences	  in	  children’s	  imitative	  behavior.	  	  For	  example,	  
Bandura,	  Ross,	  and	  Ross	  (1963)	  showed	  that	  3-­‐	  to	  5-­‐year-­‐old	  children	  are	  more	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likely	  to	  copy	  an	  individual	  who	  controls	  resources	  than	  an	  individual	  who	  
consumes	  those	  resources.	  In	  related	  research,	  Chudek,	  Heller,	  Birch,	  and	  
Henrich	  (2011)	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  children	  show	  the	  ‘prestige’	  bias	  in	  their	  
imitation:	  3-­‐	  and	  4-­‐year-­‐old	  children	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  copy	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  
model	  who	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  others’	  visual	  attention.	  The	  connections	  
between	  imitation	  and	  status	  in	  children’s	  own	  imitative	  behavior	  suggest	  that	  
they	  may	  be	  able	  to	  recognize	  a	  general	  link	  between	  imitation	  and	  relative	  
status	  and	  use	  it	  when	  observing	  others	  to	  infer	  who	  is	  dominant	  over	  whom.	  	  	  
	   In	  the	  experiments	  we	  report	  here,	  we	  presented	  children	  with	  videos	  in	  
which	  one	  individual	  imitated	  another	  and	  then	  asked	  them	  questions	  about	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  individuals	  involved.	  In	  Experiment	  1,	  we	  
test	  whether	  children	  are	  able	  to	  use	  imitation	  as	  a	  means	  by	  which	  to	  infer	  
affiliative	  relations.	  In	  Experiment	  2,	  we	  test	  whether	  children	  are	  able	  to	  use	  
imitation	  as	  a	  means	  by	  which	  to	  infer	  relative	  status.	  	  
	   We	  began	  by	  testing	  these	  predictions	  with	  5-­‐year-­‐old	  children.	  	  We	  
wanted	  to	  focus	  on	  an	  age	  group	  that	  could	  not	  only	  make	  judgments	  about	  
imitative	  interactions	  but	  potentially	  explain	  those	  judgments	  to	  us	  as	  well.	  In	  
addition,	  imitation	  researchers	  have	  recently	  focused	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  on	  
this	  age	  range	  (e.g.,	  Lyons,	  Young,	  &	  Keil,	  2007;	  Horner	  &	  Whiten,	  2005;	  Nielsen	  
&	  Blank,	  2011;	  Wood,	  Kendall,	  &	  Flynn,	  2012)	  and,	  in	  particular,	  on	  the	  question	  
of	  how	  social	  their	  imitative	  behavior	  is	  (e.g.,	  Lyons	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Over	  &	  
Carpenter,	  2012;	  2013).	  	  By	  focusing	  on	  children	  in	  this	  age	  range	  we	  hoped	  to	  
be	  able	  to	  contribute	  to	  this	  debate.	  Once	  we	  obtained	  results	  from	  the	  5-­‐year-­‐
olds,	  we	  decided	  to	  test	  a	  sample	  of	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  as	  well	  in	  order	  to	  examine	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whether	  younger	  children	  could	  make	  these	  inferences.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  we	  started	  
to	  address	  the	  question	  of	  developmental	  change	  in	  this	  ability.	  
	  
Experiment	  1	  
In	  this	  experiment,	  we	  investigated	  whether	  children	  can	  infer	  affiliative	  
relations	  from	  observing	  others’	  imitation.	  We	  presented	  children	  with	  videos	  in	  
which	  a	  central	  character	  imitated	  one	  of	  two	  other	  individuals.	  Following	  the	  
video	  presentation,	  we	  asked	  children	  who	  they	  thought	  the	  central	  character	  
liked	  more.	  We	  predicted	  that	  children	  would	  infer	  that	  the	  central	  character	  
preferred	  the	  individual	  she	  had	  imitated.	  In	  order	  to	  check	  that	  children	  were	  
basing	  their	  decisions	  on	  the	  imitation	  rather	  than	  some	  other	  factor,	  we	  also	  




Participants	  were	  40	  five-­‐year-­‐olds	  (mean	  age	  5	  years,	  6	  months;	  age	  
range	  5	  years,	  0	  months	  –	  5	  years,	  11	  months)	  and	  40	  four-­‐year-­‐olds	  (mean	  age	  4	  
years,	  5	  months,	  age	  range	  4	  years,	  0	  months	  –	  4	  years,	  11	  months).	  Forty	  of	  the	  
participants	  were	  female	  and	  40	  were	  male.	  An	  additional	  5-­‐year-­‐old	  was	  tested	  
but	  excluded	  from	  analyses	  for	  failing	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  test	  questions.	  Five	  
additional	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  were	  tested	  but	  excluded	  for	  failing	  to	  make	  a	  clear	  choice	  
at	  test,	  that	  is,	  refusing	  to	  point	  to	  either	  individual	  or	  pointing	  to	  different	  
individuals	  across	  the	  course	  of	  the	  experiment	  (4)	  or	  experimenter	  error	  (1).	  	  
Children	  in	  both	  experiments	  were	  tested	  in	  their	  kindergartens	  in	  a	  
middle-­‐sized	  town.	  Although	  no	  specific	  demographic	  data	  were	  collected,	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participants	  came	  from	  mostly	  middle-­‐class	  backgrounds,	  and	  approximately	  
98%	  of	  the	  population	  from	  which	  the	  sample	  was	  drawn	  is	  native	  German.	  The	  




Children	  watched	  a	  video	  lasting	  approximately	  90	  seconds	  in	  which	  
three	  women,	  dressed	  identically,	  sat	  on	  the	  floor	  side-­‐by-­‐side,	  equidistant	  from	  
each	  other	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  In	  the	  video,	  the	  individuals	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  display	  
performed	  a	  series	  of	  contrasting	  actions	  in	  turn	  and	  the	  woman	  in	  the	  center	  
reacted	  to	  this	  by	  imitating	  one	  of	  them	  but	  not	  the	  other.	  First,	  one	  of	  the	  
individuals	  (counterbalanced)	  changed	  her	  sitting	  position	  (e.g.,	  she	  crossed	  her	  
legs),	  and	  then	  the	  other	  individual	  changed	  her	  sitting	  position	  in	  a	  different	  
way	  (e.g.,	  she	  moved	  both	  legs	  to	  one	  side).	  After	  this,	  the	  woman	  in	  the	  center	  
reacted.	  She	  began	  by	  looking,	  with	  a	  neutral	  facial	  expression,	  at	  each	  of	  these	  
individuals	  in	  turn,	  attending	  to	  each	  of	  them	  equally.	  She	  then	  imitated	  one	  of	  
them	  (the	  same	  one	  each	  time),	  for	  example	  by	  crossing	  her	  own	  legs.	  As	  she	  did	  
this,	  she	  looked	  directly	  into	  the	  camera	  (rather	  than	  at	  either	  of	  the	  peripheral	  
individuals).	  	  A	  similar	  sequence	  of	  events	  followed	  for	  three	  further	  sets	  of	  
actions.	  	  Each	  time,	  after	  the	  peripheral	  individuals	  had	  performed	  their	  actions	  
and	  the	  woman	  in	  the	  center	  had	  looked	  at	  both	  individuals	  in	  turn,	  the	  woman	  
in	  the	  center	  imitated	  one	  of	  them:	  	  she	  chose	  the	  same	  color	  scarf	  that	  one	  of	  the	  
individuals	  had	  chosen	  to	  put	  on	  (e.g.,	  yellow	  rather	  than	  green),	  then	  the	  action	  
that	  that	  individual	  had	  performed	  on	  an	  object	  (e.g.,	  rolling	  a	  colored	  tube	  
between	  her	  hands	  as	  opposed	  to	  along	  the	  floor)	  and	  finally,	  the	  way	  she	  sat	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once	  more	  (e.g.,	  with	  her	  knees	  pulled	  up	  to	  her	  chest	  as	  opposed	  to	  out	  to	  one	  
side).	  For	  counterbalancing	  purposes,	  two	  versions	  of	  this	  video	  were	  created,	  
one	  in	  which	  the	  central	  individual	  imitated	  each	  of	  the	  two	  peripheral	  
individuals.	  The	  video	  was	  presented	  on	  a	  laptop	  computer	  placed	  on	  a	  child-­‐
sized	  table.	  	  
	  
Procedure	  
The	  experimenter	  (E)	  invited	  children	  individually	  into	  a	  quiet	  room	  in	  
their	  kindergarten	  and	  asked	  them	  to	  sit	  in	  front	  of	  the	  computer	  screen.	  E	  
introduced	  the	  video	  to	  children	  by	  drawing	  their	  attention	  to	  the	  start	  screen	  
(showing	  the	  three	  individuals	  seated	  on	  the	  floor	  facing	  the	  camera)	  and	  saying,	  
“Now	  you	  can	  watch	  a	  video.	  The	  video	  shows	  three	  people.”	  She	  then	  pointed	  to	  
the	  central	  individual	  and	  said,	  “This	  person	  likes	  one	  of	  these	  two	  people	  better	  
than	  the	  other	  one	  [pointing	  in	  turn	  to	  the	  individuals	  on	  the	  left	  and	  right	  of	  the	  
central	  character].	  After	  you’ve	  watched	  it,	  I	  want	  you	  to	  tell	  me	  which	  person	  
she	  likes	  better.”	  Once	  children	  had	  watched	  the	  video,	  E	  pointed	  once	  more	  at	  
the	  central	  individual	  and	  said,	  “She	  likes	  one	  of	  these	  two	  people	  better	  than	  the	  
other.	  	  Who	  do	  you	  think	  she	  likes	  more,	  her	  or	  her?”	  [pointing	  once	  more	  to	  the	  
peripheral	  individuals	  on	  the	  left	  and	  right].	  Once	  children	  had	  responded	  by	  
pointing	  at	  one	  of	  the	  two	  individuals,	  E	  asked	  them	  to	  justify	  their	  decision	  by	  
saying,	  “Why	  do	  you	  think	  she	  likes	  her	  more?”	  If	  children	  did	  not	  respond	  to	  a	  
question,	  E	  repeated	  it.	  Once	  children	  had	  answered	  the	  justification	  question,	  
the	  procedure	  was	  complete.	  E	  thanked	  them	  for	  their	  participation	  and	  took	  




Children	  responded	  to	  the	  question	  ‘Who	  does	  she	  like	  more?’	  by	  pointing	  
to	  one	  of	  the	  two	  peripheral	  individuals.	  These	  responses	  were	  coded	  from	  video	  
by	  the	  first	  author.	  Children’s	  responses	  to	  the	  question	  ‘Why	  do	  you	  think	  she	  
likes	  her	  more?’	  were	  later	  transcribed	  from	  video	  by	  the	  experimenter.	  These	  
responses	  were	  then	  coded	  into	  three	  categories	  by	  the	  first	  author.	  The	  first	  
category	  consisted	  of	  responses	  that	  referenced	  imitation	  explicitly,	  such	  as	  
“because	  she	  copied	  everything”	  and	  “because	  she	  copied	  what	  she	  did.”	  The	  
second	  category	  consisted	  of	  responses	  that	  referenced	  imitation	  more	  
implicitly,	  for	  example	  “because	  she	  rolls	  with	  the	  hands	  and	  took	  yellow.”	  The	  
third	  category	  consisted	  of	  irrelevant	  responses,	  for	  example	  “I	  don’t	  know”	  or	  
“because	  I	  think	  that,”	  or	  no	  response	  at	  all.	  	  	  
A	  rater	  who	  was	  unaware	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  the	  experiment	  
independently	  coded	  a	  randomly-­‐chosen	  25%	  of	  the	  data	  at	  each	  age.	  	  For	  the	  5-­‐
year-­‐olds,	  agreement	  was	  perfect	  for	  the	  question	  ‘Who	  does	  she	  like	  more?’	  and	  
80%	  for	  the	  question	  ‘Why	  do	  you	  think	  she	  likes	  her	  more?’	  (Cohen’s	  kappa	  
=.64).	  For	  the	  4-­‐year-­‐olds,	  agreement	  was	  perfect	  for	  both	  the	  question	  ‘Who	  
does	  she	  like	  more?’	  and	  for	  the	  question	  ‘Why	  do	  you	  think	  she	  likes	  her	  more?’	  
	  
Results	  and	  discussion	  
Five-­‐year-­‐olds	  
Preliminary	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  revealed	  no	  effect	  of	  the	  
counterbalancing	  of	  the	  individual	  who	  was	  imitated	  (X2(1)=.14,	  p=.71)	  and	  no	  
effect	  of	  children’s	  gender	  (X2(1)=.14,	  p=.71)	  on	  performance.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	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data	  were	  collapsed	  across	  these	  variables	  and	  the	  distinctions	  are	  not	  
considered	  further.	  	  	  
Overall,	  77.5%	  of	  5-­‐year-­‐olds	  inferred	  that	  the	  central	  individual	  liked	  the	  
individual	  she	  imitated,	  and	  22.5%	  inferred	  that	  she	  liked	  the	  other	  individual.	  
This	  difference	  is	  significant	  (X2(1)=12.1,	  p<.001,	  r=.55).	  	  Turning	  to	  the	  
justifications,	  of	  those	  children	  who	  answered	  in	  the	  predicted	  direction,	  87.1%	  
referenced	  imitation	  explicitly,	  6.5%	  referenced	  imitation	  more	  implicitly,	  and	  
6.5%	  made	  no	  reference	  to	  imitation	  at	  all	  or	  failed	  to	  justify	  their	  decision.	  
These	  results	  demonstrate	  that	  5-­‐year-­‐old	  children	  are	  able	  to	  infer	  affiliative	  
relations	  from	  observing	  others’	  imitation.	  Furthermore,	  they	  show	  that	  children	  
often	  have	  explicit	  awareness	  of	  the	  role	  imitation	  plays	  in	  this	  inference	  as	  
indicated	  by	  their	  answers	  to	  the	  justification	  question.	  	  
	  
Four-­‐year-­‐olds	   	  
	   Preliminary	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  revealed	  no	  effect	  of	  counterbalancing	  
(X2(1)=.10,	  p=.75)	  and	  no	  effect	  of	  children’s	  gender	  (X2(1)=.10,	  p=.75)	  on	  
performance.	  	  We	  thus	  collapsed	  across	  these	  variables	  and	  do	  not	  consider	  
them	  further.	  	  	  
Overall,	  57.5%	  of	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  inferred	  that	  the	  central	  individual	  liked	  the	  
individual	  she	  imitated,	  and	  42.5%	  inferred	  that	  she	  liked	  the	  other	  individual.	  
Unlike	  the	  5-­‐year-­‐olds,	  this	  difference	  does	  not	  reach	  significance	  (X2(1)=.9,	  
p=.63).	  	  Turning	  to	  the	  justifications,	  of	  those	  children	  who	  did	  answer	  in	  the	  
predicted	  direction,	  only	  21.7%	  referenced	  imitation	  explicitly	  in	  their	  
justification,	  8.7%	  referenced	  imitation	  more	  implicitly,	  and	  69.6%	  either	  made	  
no	  reference	  to	  imitation	  at	  all	  or	  failed	  to	  justify	  their	  decision.	  Thus,	  as	  a	  group,	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4-­‐year-­‐olds	  did	  not	  show	  evidence	  of	  understanding	  that	  imitation	  conveys	  
information	  about	  liking.	  However,	  a	  small	  minority	  of	  children	  (12.5%	  of	  the	  
total	  sample)	  both	  answered	  correctly	  and	  justified	  their	  answer	  appropriately,	  
suggesting	  that	  some	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  might	  be	  able	  to	  make	  this	  type	  of	  inference.	  	  
	  
Age	  comparison	  
In	  addition	  to	  examining	  performance	  in	  the	  two	  age	  groups	  separately,	  
we	  also	  compared	  them.	  	  A	  chi	  square	  test	  of	  independence	  revealed	  that	  there	  
was	  a	  trend	  for	  the	  5-­‐year-­‐olds	  to	  choose	  the	  individual	  the	  central	  character	  
imitated	  more	  often	  than	  did	  the	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  (X2(1)=	  3.65,	  p=.056).	  	  In	  a	  second	  
analysis,	  we	  took	  children’s	  justifications	  into	  account	  by	  comparing	  the	  number	  
of	  children	  who	  both	  answered	  correctly	  and	  justified	  their	  answer	  by	  explicitly	  
referencing	  imitation	  at	  each	  age.	  Another	  chi	  square	  test	  of	  independence	  
revealed	  that	  significantly	  more	  5-­‐year-­‐olds	  than	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  did	  this	  
(X2(1)=25.21,	  p<.0001).	  	  Thus	  the	  ability	  to	  infer	  affiliative	  relations	  from	  
observing	  imitative	  interactions	  as	  measured	  by	  this	  paradigm	  improves	  
between	  the	  ages	  of	  four	  and	  five.	  
	  
Experiment	  2	  
In	  this	  experiment,	  we	  investigated	  whether	  children	  are	  able	  to	  make	  
inferences	  about	  a	  different	  type	  of	  social	  relationship,	  relative	  status,	  from	  
watching	  others	  imitate.	  	  We	  presented	  children	  with	  videos	  in	  which	  one	  
individual	  imitated	  another	  and	  then	  asked	  them	  which	  individual	  was	  the	  boss	  
(we	  chose	  the	  word	  ‘boss’	  as	  we	  reasoned	  that	  it	  would	  be	  much	  easier	  for	  young	  
children	  to	  understand	  than	  the	  more	  technical	  term	  ‘status’	  while	  still	  capturing	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the	  hierarchical	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship).	  We	  predicted	  that,	  in	  this	  situation,	  
children	  would	  infer	  that	  the	  imitator	  was	  relatively	  lower	  in	  status	  than	  the	  
individual	  who	  was	  imitated.	  	  As	  low	  status	  is	  generally	  seen	  as	  undesirable	  both	  
by	  adults	  (Cheng	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Henrich	  &	  Gil-­‐White,	  2001;	  Martens	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  
and	  children	  (Hailey	  &	  Olson,	  2013;	  Horwitz	  et	  al.,	  in	  press;	  Newheiser,	  Dunham,	  
Merrill,	  Hoosain,	  &	  Olson,	  2014),	  we	  thus	  start	  to	  test	  whether	  imitating	  another	  




Participants	  were	  a	  new	  sample	  of	  40	  five-­‐year-­‐olds	  (mean	  age	  5	  years,	  5	  
months,	  age	  range	  5	  years,	  0	  months	  –	  5	  years,	  11	  months)	  and	  40	  four-­‐year-­‐olds	  
(mean	  age	  4	  years,	  5	  months,	  age	  range	  4	  years,	  0	  months	  –	  4	  years,	  11	  months).	  
Forty	  of	  these	  participants	  were	  female	  and	  40	  were	  male.	  	  Three	  additional	  5-­‐
year-­‐olds	  were	  tested	  but	  excluded	  for	  failing	  to	  provide	  a	  clear	  response	  (2)	  and	  
experimenter	  error	  (1).	  Six	  additional	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  were	  tested	  but	  excluded	  for	  
failing	  to	  provide	  a	  clear	  response	  (5)	  and	  experimenter	  error	  (1).	  	  
	  
Materials	  
Children	  watched	  a	  video	  lasting	  approximately	  60	  seconds	  in	  which	  two	  
women	  sat	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  on	  the	  floor	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  In	  this	  video,	  one	  woman	  
performed	  a	  series	  of	  actions	  and	  the	  other	  woman	  imitated	  her.	  In	  order	  to	  
enable	  comparison	  across	  experiments,	  the	  actions	  presented	  in	  the	  status	  video	  
were	  matched	  as	  closely	  as	  possible	  to	  those	  used	  in	  the	  liking	  video.	  First	  the	  
imitator	  copied	  the	  other	  individual’s	  seating	  position	  (legs	  crossed),	  then	  her	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choice	  of	  scarf	  (green	  rather	  than	  yellow),	  then	  her	  action	  on	  an	  object	  (rolling	  a	  
colored	  tube	  between	  her	  hands),	  and	  finally	  her	  seating	  position	  once	  more	  
(sitting	  with	  her	  legs	  stretched	  out	  in	  front	  of	  her).	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  any	  
effects	  we	  found	  were	  not	  simply	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  imitator	  always	  acted	  
second,	  the	  imitator	  also	  initiated	  some	  actions	  individually	  (i.e.,	  half	  of	  the	  time	  
she	  performed	  an	  action,	  e.g.,	  moving	  a	  cup	  from	  one	  side	  of	  the	  floor	  to	  the	  
other,	  alone).	  The	  number	  of	  times	  the	  two	  individuals	  looked	  at	  each	  other,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  quality	  of	  those	  (neutral)	  looks,	  was	  strictly	  controlled.	  For	  
counterbalancing	  purposes,	  two	  videos	  were	  created,	  one	  in	  which	  each	  
individual	  imitated	  the	  other.	  (As	  the	  two	  individuals	  sat	  in	  the	  same	  location	  for	  
both	  videos	  this	  means	  that	  for	  one	  video	  the	  imitator	  was	  presented	  on	  the	  left	  
of	  the	  screen	  and	  for	  the	  other	  video	  the	  imitator	  was	  presented	  on	  the	  right	  of	  
the	  screen.)	  	  
	  
Procedure	  
E	  invited	  children	  individually	  into	  a	  quiet	  room	  in	  their	  kindergarten	  and	  
asked	  them	  to	  sit	  in	  front	  of	  the	  computer	  screen.	  E	  introduced	  the	  video	  to	  
children	  by	  drawing	  their	  attention	  to	  the	  start	  screen	  (showing	  the	  two	  
individuals	  seated	  on	  the	  floor)	  and	  saying,	  “Now	  you	  can	  watch	  a	  video.	  The	  
video	  shows	  two	  people.	  One	  of	  these	  two	  people	  is	  the	  boss	  of	  the	  other.	  After	  
you’ve	  watched	  it,	  I	  want	  you	  to	  tell	  me	  which	  of	  the	  two	  people	  is	  the	  boss.”	  
Once	  the	  video	  was	  finished	  E	  said,	  “One	  of	  these	  people	  is	  the	  boss	  of	  the	  other.	  
Who	  do	  you	  think	  is	  the	  boss,	  her	  or	  her?”	  (pointing	  first	  to	  the	  individual	  on	  the	  
left	  and	  then	  to	  the	  individual	  on	  the	  right).	  Once	  children	  gave	  a	  response,	  E	  
asked	  them	  to	  justify	  their	  decision	  by	  saying,	  “Why	  do	  you	  think	  she	  is	  the	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boss?”	  If	  children	  did	  not	  answer	  a	  question,	  E	  asked	  it	  again.	  Once	  children	  had	  
answered	  the	  justification	  question,	  the	  procedure	  was	  complete.	  E	  thanked	  
them	  for	  their	  participation	  and	  took	  them	  back	  to	  their	  classroom.	  
	  
Coding	  	  
The	  procedure	  for	  coding	  the	  data	  and	  the	  coding	  categories	  were	  the	  
same	  as	  those	  used	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  Twenty-­‐five	  percent	  of	  the	  data	  at	  each	  age	  
was	  independently	  coded	  by	  a	  rater	  who	  was	  unaware	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  the	  
experiment.	  For	  the	  5-­‐year-­‐olds,	  agreement	  was	  perfect	  for	  the	  question	  ‘Who	  is	  
the	  boss?’	  and	  for	  the	  question	  ‘Why	  do	  you	  think	  she	  is	  the	  boss.’	  For	  the	  4-­‐year-­‐
olds,	  agreement	  was	  90%	  both	  for	  the	  question	  ‘Who	  is	  the	  boss?’	  and	  for	  the	  
question	  ‘Why	  do	  you	  think	  she	  is	  the	  boss?’	  (kappas	  =	  .71).	  	  
	  
Results	  and	  discussion	  
Five-­‐year-­‐olds	  
Preliminary	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  revealed	  that,	  although	  there	  was	  a	  
marginal	  effect	  of	  counterbalancing,	  it	  did	  not	  reach	  significance	  (X2(1)=2.85,	  
p=.09).	  There	  was	  no	  effect	  of	  children’s	  gender	  (X2(1)=1.03,	  p=.311).	  	  The	  data	  
were	  therefore	  collapsed	  across	  these	  variables.	  	  
Overall,	  67.5%	  of	  5-­‐year-­‐olds	  chose	  the	  individual	  who	  was	  imitated	  as	  
the	  boss,	  and	  32.5%	  chose	  the	  imitator.	  This	  difference	  is	  significant	  (X2(1)=4.9,	  
p=.03,	  r=.35).	  Of	  those	  children	  who	  answered	  in	  the	  predicted	  direction,	  44.4%	  
referenced	  imitation	  explicitly	  in	  their	  justifications,	  22.2%	  referenced	  it	  
implicitly,	  and	  33.3%	  either	  made	  no	  reference	  to	  imitation	  at	  all	  or	  failed	  to	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justify	  their	  decision.	  Thus	  5-­‐year-­‐old	  children	  are	  able	  to	  use	  imitation	  to	  make	  
inferences	  about	  status	  relations	  as	  well	  as	  about	  affiliative	  relations.	  	  	  
	  
Four-­‐year-­‐olds	  
Preliminary	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  revealed	  no	  effect	  of	  counterbalancing	  
(X2(1)=.1,	  p=.75)	  and	  no	  effect	  of	  children’s	  gender	  (X2(1)=.92,	  p=.340	  on	  
performance.	  We	  thus	  collapsed	  across	  these	  variables	  and	  do	  not	  consider	  them	  
further.	  	  	  
Overall	  52.5%	  of	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  chose	  the	  individual	  who	  was	  imitated	  as	  the	  
boss,	  and	  47.5%	  chose	  the	  imitator.	  This	  difference	  is	  not	  significant	  (X2(1)=.1,	  
p=.75).	  Of	  those	  who	  did	  respond	  in	  the	  prediction	  direction,	  only	  14.3%	  
referenced	  imitation	  explicitly,	  9.5%	  referenced	  it	  implicitly,	  and	  76.2%	  either	  
made	  no	  reference	  to	  imitation	  at	  all	  or	  failed	  to	  justify	  their	  decision.	  	  
	  
Age	  comparison	  
A	  chi	  square	  test	  of	  independence	  on	  children’s	  choices	  revealed	  that	  
there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  performance	  between	  the	  two	  ages,	  
(X2(1)=1.86,	  p=.17).	  In	  a	  second	  analysis,	  we	  took	  children’s	  justifications	  into	  
account	  by	  comparing	  the	  number	  of	  children	  who	  both	  answered	  correctly	  and	  
justified	  their	  answer	  by	  explicitly	  referencing	  imitation	  at	  each	  age.	  Another	  chi	  
square	  test	  of	  independence	  revealed	  that	  significantly	  more	  5-­‐year-­‐olds	  than	  4-­‐
year-­‐olds	  did	  this	  (X2(1)=6.65,	  p=.01).	  There	  thus	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  similar	  
developmental	  pattern	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  how	  imitation	  relates	  to	  liking	  




With	  these	  experiments	  we	  focused	  on	  the	  broader	  social	  context	  in	  
which	  imitation	  occurs.	  	  In	  particular,	  we	  investigated	  whether	  children	  can	  
make	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  inferences	  about	  third	  party	  relationships	  from	  
watching	  others	  imitate.	  In	  Experiment	  1,	  we	  demonstrated	  that	  5-­‐year-­‐olds	  can	  
infer	  affiliative	  relationships	  from	  watching	  who	  imitates	  whom.	  	  In	  particular,	  
they	  can	  infer	  that	  individuals	  imitate	  people	  they	  like.	  Children’s	  justifications	  
demonstrated	  that	  they	  often	  have	  explicit	  awareness	  of	  the	  role	  that	  imitation	  
played	  in	  their	  decisions.	  This	  result	  adds	  a	  crucial	  piece	  of	  evidence	  to	  the	  
argument	  that	  imitation	  serves	  social	  functions	  in	  development	  (Nielsen,	  2009;	  
Over	  &	  Carpenter,	  2012;	  2013).	  We	  now	  have	  converging	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  
this	  claim	  from	  three	  different	  lines	  of	  enquiry.	  First,	  children	  use	  imitation	  
themselves	  when	  they	  seek	  to	  affiliate	  with	  others	  (e.g.,	  Nielsen	  &	  Blank,	  2011;	  
Over	  &	  Carpenter,	  2009b).	  	  Second,	  children	  respond	  positively	  to	  being	  imitated	  
(e.g.,	  Carpenter	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Meltzoff,	  1990;	  Over	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  	  Third,	  as	  we	  have	  
shown	  here,	  children	  infer	  information	  about	  affiliation	  from	  watching	  others’	  
imitative	  interactions.	  	  
	   Experiment	  2	  demonstrated	  that	  5-­‐year-­‐olds	  are	  also	  able	  to	  infer	  relative	  
status	  from	  others’	  imitative	  behavior.	  	  In	  this	  experiment,	  children	  inferred	  that	  
an	  individual	  who	  imitated	  someone	  else	  was	  lower	  in	  status.	  	  Children’s	  
justifications	  suggested	  that	  many	  children	  had	  either	  explicit	  or	  implicit	  
awareness	  of	  the	  role	  imitation	  played	  in	  their	  decisions.	  	  We	  know	  from	  
previous	  research	  that	  children	  are	  sensitive	  to	  differences	  in	  dominance	  from	  
early	  in	  development	  (Mascaro	  &	  Csibra,	  2012;	  Thomsen,	  Frankenhuis,	  Ingold-­‐
Smith,	  &	  Carey,	  2011)	  and	  that	  they	  imitate	  high	  status	  individuals	  themselves	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within	  social	  interactions	  (Bandura	  et	  al.,	  1963;	  Chudek	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  As	  far	  as	  
we	  know,	  this	  is	  the	  first	  demonstration,	  at	  any	  age,	  that	  individuals	  are	  able	  to	  
use	  observations	  of	  imitative	  behavior	  to	  infer	  others’	  hierarchical	  relationships.	  
Whereas	  much	  previous	  research,	  both	  with	  adults	  and	  with	  children,	  has	  
emphasized	  the	  positive	  role	  that	  imitation	  plays	  in	  regulating	  social	  
relationships	  (Lakin	  &	  Chartrand,	  2003;	  Lakin,	  Jefferis,	  Cheng,	  &	  Chartrand,	  
2003;	  Nielsen,	  2006;	  Over	  &	  Carpenter,	  2009b;	  van	  Baaren	  et	  al.,	  2004),	  this	  
work	  suggests	  that,	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  imitation	  may	  also	  have	  some	  
negative	  consequences	  for	  the	  imitator	  (see	  also	  Kavanagh	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  in	  that	  it	  
lowers	  his	  or	  her	  perceived	  status	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  onlookers.	  	  Future	  research	  
should	  investigate	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  of	  these	  negative	  consequences	  in	  more	  
detail.	  
In	  addition	  to	  contributing	  to	  the	  imitation	  literature,	  the	  current	  
research	  contributes	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  children’s	  understanding	  of	  third	  party	  
relationships.	  Understanding	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  third	  
parties	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance	  to	  children.	  When	  watching	  others	  interact	  
in	  playgrounds	  or	  classrooms,	  for	  example,	  recognizing	  who	  is	  friends	  with	  
whom	  and	  who	  is	  higher	  status	  than	  whom	  can	  help	  children	  to	  predict	  the	  
outcome	  of	  interactions	  between	  others.	  	  We	  know	  from	  previous	  research	  that	  
children	  are	  able	  to	  use	  cues	  like	  body	  posture	  and	  gaze	  to	  understand	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  others	  (Brey	  &	  Shutts,	  in	  press;	  Nurmsoo,	  
Einav,	  &	  Hood,	  2012).	  	  We	  extend	  this	  literature	  by	  showing	  that	  they	  are	  also	  
able	  to	  use	  imitation	  as	  a	  cue	  to	  understanding	  their	  social	  world.	  	  
	   	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  we	  saw	  a	  similar	  developmental	  progression	  in	  
understanding	  in	  both	  the	  affiliation	  and	  status	  experiments.	  Whereas	  5-­‐year-­‐
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olds	  were	  able	  to	  infer	  both	  liking	  and	  status	  relations	  from	  observing	  imitation,	  
as	  a	  group,	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  showed	  little	  evidence	  of	  being	  able	  to	  make	  either	  
inference.	  Nevertheless,	  some	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  performed	  well	  on	  the	  tasks,	  not	  only	  
answering	  correctly	  but	  justifying	  their	  answers	  appropriately.	  Furthermore,	  4-­‐
year-­‐olds’	  responses	  were	  in	  the	  same	  direction	  as	  those	  of	  the	  5-­‐year-­‐olds	  and	  
indeed,	  when	  the	  two	  age	  groups	  were	  directly	  compared,	  evidence	  for	  
developmental	  change	  was	  equivocal.	  	  We	  are	  thus	  more	  inclined	  to	  interpret	  
this	  as	  a	  gradual	  developmental	  change	  rather	  than	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  in	  
understanding	  between	  4	  and	  5	  years	  of	  age.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  
speculate	  as	  to	  why	  5-­‐year-­‐olds	  performed	  better	  in	  the	  two	  experiments.	  	  
Intriguingly	  the	  developmental	  progression	  fits	  well	  with	  that	  found	  in	  another	  
experiment	  investigating	  children’s	  understanding	  of	  third	  party	  relationships.	  
Nurmsoo	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  demonstrated	  that	  5-­‐	  and	  6-­‐year-­‐olds	  but	  not	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  
were	  able	  to	  infer	  who	  is	  friends	  with	  whom	  from	  observing	  their	  mutual	  gaze.	  
One	  possible	  explanation	  for	  these	  results,	  following	  Nurmsoo	  et	  al.,	  is	  that	  5-­‐
year-­‐olds	  simply	  have	  more	  experience	  negotiating	  friendship	  relations	  and	  
dominance	  hierarchies	  than	  do	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  (see	  also	  Brey	  &	  Shutts,	  in	  press).	  It	  
would	  be	  interesting	  for	  future	  research	  to	  investigate	  individual	  differences	  in	  
social	  experience	  and	  competence	  and	  measure	  whether	  they	  correlate	  with	  
performance	  on	  these	  tasks.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  worth	  emphasizing	  that	  the	  
failure	  of	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  on	  our	  tasks	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  possibility	  that	  they	  
might	  perform	  better	  on	  more	  implicit,	  nonverbal	  tasks.	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  
even	  infants	  understand	  something	  about	  third	  party	  affiliative	  relations	  (e.g.,	  
Over	  &	  Carpenter,	  2009a;	  Kuhlmeier,	  Wynn,	  &	  Bloom,	  2003)	  and	  relative	  
dominance	  (Mascaro	  &	  Csibra,	  2012;	  Thomsen	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  It	  will	  therefore	  be	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important	  for	  future	  research	  to	  explore	  these	  questions,	  using	  more	  implicit	  
measures,	  even	  earlier	  in	  development.	  	  
	   The	  present	  research	  adds	  to	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  evidence	  demonstrating	  
just	  how	  deeply	  social	  imitation	  is	  (Nielsen,	  2009;	  Over	  &	  Carpenter,	  2012;	  
2013).	  By	  focusing	  on	  the	  broader	  social	  context	  in	  which	  imitation	  occurs,	  we	  
have	  been	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  children	  can	  draw	  on	  imitation	  in	  order	  to	  
make	  inferences	  about	  others’	  relationships.	  By	  paying	  attention	  to	  who	  imitates	  
whom,	  children	  can	  learn	  about	  the	  friendship	  and	  dominance	  relations	  that	  
shape	  their	  social	  world.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  this	  work	  provides	  a	  more	  complete	  view	  
of	  the	  role	  of	  imitation	  in	  human	  social	  life.	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Figure	  Captions	  
Figure	  1.	  Still	  frames	  from	  one	  of	  the	  videos	  used	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  The	  central	  
character	  imitating	  the	  woman	  on	  the	  left’s	  a)	  seating	  position	  b)	  clothing	  choice	  
c)	  action	  on	  an	  object	  d)	  seating	  position	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  Still	  frames	  from	  one	  of	  the	  videos	  used	  in	  Experiment	  2.	  The	  woman	  on	  
the	  right	  imitating	  the	  woman	  on	  the	  left’s	  a)	  seating	  position	  b)	  clothing	  choice	  
c)	  action	  on	  an	  object	  d)	  seating	  position	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Figure	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